Online Verification Concept for Autonomous Vehicles -- Illustrative
  Study for a Trajectory Planning Module by Stahl, Tim et al.
Online Verification Concept for Autonomous Vehicles –
Illustrative Study for a Trajectory Planning Module
Tim Stahl1,3, Matthis Eicher2, Johannes Betz1, Frank Diermeyer1
Abstract—Regulatory approval and safety guaran-
tees for autonomous vehicles facing frequent func-
tional updates and complex software stacks, including
artificial intelligence, are a challenging topic. This
paper proposes a concept and guideline for the de-
velopment of an online verification module – the
Supervisor – capable of handling the aforementioned
challenges. The concept presented for the establish-
ment of a Supervisor is designed in a way to identify
and monitor an extensive list of features contributing
to safe operation. As a result, a safe overall (sub)sys-
tem is attained. Safeguarding a motion planner of
an autonomous race vehicle is used to illustrate the
procedure and practicability of the framework at hand.
The capabilities of the proposed method are evaluated
in a scenario-based test environment and on full-scale
vehicle data.
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I. Introduction
Every 24 seconds, on average, someone died on the
roads in 2018, according to the World Health Organiza-
tion (WHO). Studies have shown that advanced driver
assistance systems (ADAS) help to reduce the number of
traffic accidents [1]. A further step in this direction is full
automation, which aims to reduce the traffic mortality
rate even more.
The research interest in the field of autonomous driving
is growing and a wide range of methods has been
developed. In the domain of motion planning alone, there
are various search-based, optimization-based and even ar-
tificial intelligence (AI)-based approaches [2], [3]. Opposed
to this development, safeguarding and approval of such
complex and frequently changing software (SW) stacks
becomes increasingly challenging. Relying on standard
methods, approval would require a prohibitive number
of test cases, and systems that are continuing their
learning process at the consumer are not addressed at all.
This trend indicates the need for new safeguarding and
approval methods [4].
In this paper, we present a generic and structured
safeguarding concept, allowing for the derivation of an
online verification (OV) module for autonomous vehicles
(AVs). The resulting OV module is independent of the
implementation or chosen approach of the function to be
monitored and can be approved by standard principles
(ISO 26262 [5]). The contribution of this work is the
derivation of a novel safeguarding concept able to cope
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Fig. 1: Supervisor ensuring a safe overall system using the
principle of ASIL decomposition (ISO 26262 [5]). A non-
ASIL-capable system is monitored online for requirement
violations by an ASIL D rated Supervisor.
with the following challenging properties of an AV’s SW
stack:
• Complex driving functions – The SW stack reaches
a volume that is too large and complex for formal
approval.
• Frequent updates – Every update requires a verifica-
tion and validation process (at least a delta analysis).
• Machine learning methods – Learning methods might
hold segments that cannot be interpreted by a human
expert and are therefore hard to approve.
• Online machine learning – Systems that continuously
keep learning on the fly are even more challenging
since the future behavior of the system can change
beyond the point of approval.
We provide a new safeguarding concept that tackles
these approval issues by relying on OV. Compared to
related work, the proposed concept aims for surveillance
of a holistic list of properties contributing to a “safe”
operation, instead of focusing on the most obvious or most
safety-critical property. The Supervisor, an OV module,
ensures that the (sub)system which does not meet the
prerequisites for approval remains within safe boundaries
(1). As a result, the overall system can be approved based
on the principle of ASIL decomposition [5]. Our results are
both conceptual and applied in nature. First, the concept
is elaborated. Second, the method is showcased by an
illustrative example of an OV module for trajectories of
an autonomous race vehicle. The algorithm is evaluated
based on simulative scenarios and on data-sets generated
with a real race vehicle.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
Section II covers related work in the field. The safe-
guarding concept is derived in Section III and detailed in
Section IV. Section V presents an illustrative example of
the framework for the OV of trajectories. A discussion
and concluding remarks are provided in Section VI.
II. Related Work
With the introduction of electric devices and computing
units in the automotive sector, it has become evident that
those systems tend to be prone to outages or misbehavior.
The ISO 26262 [5] standard offers methods to assess the
potential risk and suggests appropriate safety measures
for systems in motor vehicles. However, at higher levels
of automation, the SW required to fulfill the driving
task lacks transparency (e.g., AI [6]) and becomes too
complex to meet the requirements of ISO 26262 [7], [8].
In the following, we briefly review common safeguarding
approaches for the domain of AV.
One approach to guarantee safety is to examine the
system under test (SUT) offline, before actual usage [9].
Model-checking or branches of modal logic are used to
guarantee accordance with a specified behavior. How-
ever, frequent SW updates and online machine learning
methods cannot be properly handled by these approaches,
since the system may change post-examination.
Another approach is to monitor the system online to
enhance the level of safety [10].
One group of approaches uses probabilistic metrics
[11]–[13] to determine a collision probability or empirical
performance indicators [14] resulting in a safety rating
for the vehicle under test (VUT). However, a sufficient
safety guarantee cannot be made based on these metrics.
Furthermore, some of the trained models might extend to
complex realizations, that cannot be approved themselves.
By contrast, methods relying on formal and determinis-
tic fundamentals can provide guarantees based on imposed
requirements. Among them are reachable sets [15]–[17],
runtime verification [18], and metric-based approaches
[19], including the Responsibility-Sensitive Safety (RSS)
model [20]. However, some of the approaches are tailored
to a specific SW (e.g., a certain trajectory planner)
and cannot be bundled with other SW components or
approaches. Furthermore, all of these approaches have
in common, that they focus on selected safety aspects
(e.g., dynamic collision detection) and do not strive for a
holistic OV with the goal of safety approval.
III. Safeguarding Concept
Next, the paper motivates why the concept of OV is
suited to address the aforementioned challenges as well as
the previously elaborated shortcomings in related work.
Koopman et al. [8] identified challenges when facing
validation and verification of autonomous vehicles. The
paper proposes the use of an online monitor, which fits
well with the analysis in the previous section (especially
when including online learning or frequent updates) and
the principle of ASIL decomposition (ISO 26262). The
core idea is to cross-check results generated with a non-
traceable or complex algorithm (e.g., AI) using a simple
and traceable monitor structure. Details about implemen-
tation specifics of such a module are not provided.
Within this paper, the terms “safe” and “safety” are
interpreted in the spirit of RSS [20]. Our goal is to ensure
that the VUT will not be part of the legal cause of an
accident. Opposed to that, guaranteeing that an agent
will never be involved in an accident is impossible.
In order to assure the safe behavior of a black-box
SW component with a monitor, it must be ensured that
any output generated does not result in an unsafe state.
Approaches introduced in the previous section do not
suffice, since only some individual features are observed.
For example, if the generated trajectory of a black-box
trajectory planner (e.g., AI-based [3]) is only checked
for collision, other imperfections, such as exceeding the
friction limit, could still result in an unsafe state.
In the next section, we incrementally deduce a guideline
for the generation of an OV monitor – the Supervisor –
aiming for full safety coverage of a black-box SW compo-
nent, while still being approvable itself. The procedure
is aligned with the core steps of the V-model, and thus
also relates to the principles of ISO 26262 [5].
First, in alignment with the first step of the V-model,
the requirements are specified. Here, not only are the
requirements regarding the OV module specified, but the
requirements for a safe functionality need to be analyzed
as well. The goal is to obtain a holistic list of requirements
in order to achieve full safety coverage (Section IV-A).
This holistic view of safety requirements (considering
the overall system) allows us to assume that once all
subsystems are safe, our overall system is safe. If we were
to establish these requirements internally for each module
itself, this assumption would not hold.
Second, following the left side of the “V” further down,
the OV architecture as well as safety measures – in line
with the prerequisites of the first stage – have to be
specified and implemented (Section IV-B).
Third, following the right side of the “V” back up,
the developed function is integrated and tested against
the requirements (Section IV-C). Finally, the established
method is validated (Section IV-D).
The key steps for the generation of a holistic OV module
(Supervisor – S) are summarized in Fig. 2. Four stages
(S-1 to S-4) of system design, each with up to three key
steps (A, B, C), have to be passed. In the following, step
y of stage x is referred to by the notation S-x-y.
IV. Supervisor Development Procedure
Next, the steps introduced in the previous section are
elaborated in more detail.
A. Requirements
Before the actual development of the OV module,
the criteria contributing to a safe operation need to
be identified. Since it is a difficult task to obtain a
holistic list of criteria without unintentionally leaving
out some criteria, a structured approach is proposed.
This is achieved by deriving criteria from the interfaces
with the surrounding environment when modeling the
overall system using a systems engineering approach
– as detailed in the following paragraph. However, it
Fig. 2: Generic method for the development of an OV module. The method is structured into four stages (1-4 –
indexed from left to right), each comprising up to three steps (A, B, C – indexed from top to bottom).
should be noted that this structured process supports
the development towards a holistic list, but cannot
provide a guarantee of completeness. Nevertheless, the
final evaluation step supports keeping the probability of
undiscovered vulnerabilities low.
First, the AV and its environment is modeled by
utilizing a systems engineering approach. Bagschik et
al. [21] established a detailed ontology defining all en-
vironmental elements relevant for AVs. We use this
information to extract the fundamental subsystems of
an AV environment.1 Details about the internal function
of the system must not be known. Second, interfaces are
added between any feasible combination of subsystems
in the environment. For an AV, we obtained the system
and interfaces depicted in Fig. 3.
Finally, the criteria for a safe operation can be derived
by systematically enumerating every possible interface
between the VUT and any subsystem. In doing so, each
interface is analyzed for possible safety issues upon
occurring imperfections. The following guiding question
can be used as a basis here: “What kind of issue with this
specific interface could pose a risk to safe operation?”
Besides the criteria for safe operation, the requirements
of the Supervisor module itself need to be identified and
tackled. Hörwick et al. [22] specified metrics to be fulfilled
by OV methods. Consequently, the following requirements
have to be met by a Supervisor:
• Simple and predictable behavior (to allow safety
verification of the Supervisor itself)
• Real-time capability
• Separation from the overall system
• Integrity of the Supervisor (including the hardware)
B. Implementation
After the establishment of the basic requirements, the
interfaces and architecture of the verification module
1All layers of the ontology are used except for L3, since L3 only
holds temporary modifications of L1 and L2.
Fig. 3: System model and its interfaces based on ontology.
Solid lines indicate a physical interaction and dashed lines
an information flow. Directed arrows imply an interaction
initiated by the subsystem at the tail.
within the autonomous driving stack need to be identified.
The end and start of the OV pipeline are tracked down
based on the guidelines described below.
End of the pipeline:
• Soon after the system to be safeguarded – Keep the
complexity of the SW to be safeguarded as low as
possible to facilitate the verification process.
• Bottleneck in the system (no parallel paths) – For full
safety control, it is essential that there are no parallel
ways that may shortcut the verification decisions.
Start of the pipeline:
• Output-input span – Ensure that the span of the
modules to be verified is small enough, to avoid com-
plexity and maintain the option to use established
verification methods.
• Modularization – Do not start the pipeline at specific
modules in order to obtain a generic OV, thereby
allowing an exchange of the underlying approach or
system.
Based on the defined interfaces, the architecture and
information flow of the Supervisor are specified. Con-
straints on the layout are set by S-1-B as well as the
determined module interfaces. To fulfill the safety-related
requirements S-1-B, it is necessary to cut the information
flow of the original SW stack and plant the Supervisor
serially. Each of the inputs interfacing the Supervisor has
to align with the specification and requirements compiled
from S-1-A.
For S-2-B, an evaluation metric is designed for every
single criterion derived during the S-1-A requirements
step. Thereby, it must follow all the other constraints
obtained in the process (S-1-B and S-2-A). This step may
require expert knowledge and insight into the state-of-
the-art. If it is not possible to meet the requirements
or provide an evaluation metric for some criteria, the
architecture (S-2-A) has to be iteratively reworked.
Finally, a classification function generates a decision
(“safe” or “unsafe”) based on the S-2-B assessment metrics
for every generated system output.
C. Integration and Test
After the implementation of the architecture and
functions, the Supervisor is integrated into the SW stack
of the AV. Verification tests of internal and external
interfaces confirm a successful integration procedure.
Finally, the implemented Supervisor is verified against
the S-1-A and S-1-B requirements. Further guidelines
and recommendations on a structured integration and
verification procedure are provided in ISO 26262-4:2018,7.
D. Validation
To cope with design flaws affecting the safety goal, a
validation test with the complete framework is required.
To this end, a scenario-based and field-test validation
is recommended. The scope of the scenario-based test
(including fault injection principles) is to evaluate as
many critical scenarios as possible, whereas field operation
mainly focuses on no-fire tests. These principles form the
baseline and can be extended based on the principles
detailed in ISO 26262-4:2018,8.
V. Illustrative Example: Trajectory
The method presented here is applied to facilitate
OV of trajectories on an AV. More specifically, we
focus on autonomous race vehicles in collaboration with
Roborace [23]. Within this domain, it is possible to
evaluate the function up to the dynamic limits of a vehicle
and with aggressive close-proximity maneuvers.
In the following, all steps in the development stages
(Section IV) are tackled individually. However, it should
be noted that this simplified example only serves as an il-
lustration of the method and does not claim completeness.
A comprehensive view is part of future work.
A. Requirements
The system model for AVs introduced in Fig. 3 can be
used for the illustrative example of safeguarding generated
trajectories. All interfaces are examined with regard to
possible safety-related issues related to any imperfections
in the context of a trajectory. For example, the interface
[AV-RO] (connecting the VUT with the road) can be an
issue if the trajectory is not respecting the friction limits.
When continuing this process for all interfaces, we obtain
the following list of criteria (S-1-A-1 to S-1-A-6) for a
safe trajectory:
1) All objects in the scene must be recognized and
perceived properly ([AV-SO], [AV-TP], [AV-TI],
[AV-RO], [AV-DI], [AV-E]).
2) Physical interactions with static objects or other
traffic participants, initiated by the AV must not
occur at any time ([AV-SO], [AV-TP]).
3) The trajectory must match the actual pose in the
real world ([AV-E]).
4) The trajectory must respect the friction limits at
all times ([AV-RO]).
5) Geometric and dynamic properties of the VUT must
be respected at all times ([AV]).
6) Applicable rules of conduct (e.g., traffic or race
rules) must be obeyed ([AV-TI], [AV-DI]).
The requirements imposed on the Supervisor do not re-
quire an application-specific analysis and can be adopted
from Section IV-A.
B. Implementation
The system architecture step yields the following results.
The end of the pipeline is selected to be any single
trajectory potentially sent to the controller. The relevant
modules cover all functions associated with the planning
module, including the traffic prediction. Therefore, the
start of the pipeline is set between the perception and the
planning module (Fig. 4). The Supervisor verifies every
generated trajectory against the input data. All inputs to
the Supervisor must adhere to a fixed specification and
the inputs originating from the perception module must
be sufficiently correct at all time. The data correctness
poses an assumption here and must be verified by another
function or ensured by structural measures, e.g., vehicle-
to-everything (V2X) communication.
It should be noted here that all relevant trajectory
candidates need to be checked by the Supervisor. That
way, in a framework where an emergency trajectory2 is
generated in every time step, both the driving and emer-
gency trajectory have to be confirmed by the Supervisor.
As soon as either of these two is declared unsafe, the
emergency trajectory of the previous time step (declared
as safe) must be executed.
As detailed in Section IV-B, every requirement identi-
fied in S-1-A has to be covered by an evaluation metric.
In the following, an illustrative, albeit in some cases
limited, approach for each of the identified requirements
is outlined. This serves to showcase the implementation
of the elaborated requirements.
2An emergency trajectory is assumed to be a trajectory ending
in a safe state with zero velocity.
Fig. 4: Supervisor architecture for the illustrative example
of a trajectory OV. The planning module is assumed to
be not ASIL-capable (ISO 26262-1:2018,3.2 [5]), but with
insertion of the Supervisor, the overall system can be
approved.
S-1-A-1 (Perception of objects): This is covered by
S-2-C, since correct perception data is assumed (assured
by relying on V2X data in our case).
S-1-A-2 (Physical interactions with objects): This prob-
lem can be split into two subproblems – one concerned
with static obstacles and one focusing on dynamic objects.
A pure forward collision check along the trajectory against
all static objects addresses the first subproblem.
The second subproblem is more challenging to solve.
As dynamic objects decide on their future motion individ-
ually, there are infinitely many maneuver combinations.
To assure absolute safety, the ego-trajectory would not
be allowed to intersect (at any temporal instance) with
any possible maneuvers of other vehicles. That way it
would not be possible to overtake or bypass other agents.
Shalev-Shwartz et al. [20] introduced a formal method
relying on worst-case maneuvers (e.g., a combination
of maximum braking af,br of a vehicle in front, while
assuming maximum acceleration ar,acc and worst-case
braking ar,br for the rear vehicle). A situation is rated as
unsafe when the ego-vehicle is not able to avoid contact
while assuming a worst-case scenario. For instance, in the
longitudinal direction, based on the inter-vehicle distance
d, the maximal reaction time ρ and the velocity of the
front vf and chase vehicle vr, the following constraint
must be met:
d+
v2f
2af,br
−
(
vrρ+
1
2
ar,accρ
2 +
(vr + ρar,acc)
2
2ar,br
)
> 0. (1)
For the scope of this paper, we follow the concept devel-
oped by Shalev-Shwartz. A detailed and comprehensive
method will be addressed in future research.
S-1-A-3 (Localization must be correct): On one hand,
this condition is tackled by S-2-C, since correct perception
data is assumed. On the other hand, the trajectory must
host a coordinate 〈xi, yi〉 in a reasonable distance to the
ego-pose 〈xego, yego〉3.
S-1-A-4 (Friction limits must be respected): One part of
this demand is handled by S-2-C, since the determination
of the actual friction limit is assumed to be provided
3Commonly, this is one of the first coordinates within the
trajectory. However, based on the path-matcher of the controller
and the amount of delay and history transmitted, this may vary.
flawlessly by the perception module4. The other part
relies on a formal method calculating the actual combined
acceleration demand along the trajectory and rates it
against the maximum allowed value.
Given a trajectory (including velocity vx,i, acceleration
ax,i and curvature κi at every discrete time-step i ∈ N),
the total acceleration force Fa,i acting on the vehicle with
mass m for a time instance i is given by
Fa,i = m
√
a2x,i + a
2
y,i = m
√
a2x,i + (v
2
x,iκi)
2. (2)
The total acceleration force should not exceed the force,
the tires can counteract on the respective underground
at any time. When relying on a basic tire model5, the
tires’ maximal force is direction independent (ideal circle)
and computed by Fmax,i = µiFN, where the normal force
FN for a race vehicle is mainly influenced by the mass
and the aerodynamic configuration. To stay on the safe
side, we did not add any further aerodynamic downforce
in this example. In total, the following constraint must
hold:
∀i ∈ N,Fa,i ≤ Fmax,i. (3)
S-1-A-5 (Geometric and dynamic properties): Geomet-
ric and dynamic limits of the VUT must be forward
checked along the trajectory in a similar manner used for
S-1-A-4. For every discrete time-step i in the trajectory,
the curvature κi and acceleration ax,i are compared to
the vehicle’s physical limits. The relevant entities are the
minimal turn radius, the maximum positive acceleration
(depending on engine characteristics, the drivetrain, and
current velocity), and the maximum negative acceleration
(depending on the braking system). It should be noted,
that these constraints define the absolute bounds the
vehicle is physically able to perform. In dynamic situations
(especially at higher speeds), the road friction (S-1-A-4)
is usually the limiting factor.
S-1-A-6 (Rules of conduct): The local rules of conduct
have to be formalized into mathematical constraints to
be evaluated in every time step. In an urban scenario,
this would be the road traffic regulations of the respective
country. In the case of a race scenario, these are the race
regulations in effect. In our case, only a few restrictive
regulations were active that can be implemented with
basic rules (e.g., maximum velocity). Future research
should investigate approaches allowing rule blending and a
more flexible specification using rulebooks as, introduced
by Censi et al. [24].
Finally, the overall decision metric, classifying a tra-
jectory as “safe” or “unsafe”, is based on Boolean logic
for the illustrative example presented here. A trajectory
is rated as “unsafe” as soon as any of the constraints
detailed above is violated. Consequently, an emergency
4This assumption might appear elusive, but one approach is to
always underestimate the actual friction limit in order to guarantee
feasibility.
5This simple model serves the concept demonstration, but can
be replaced by a more advanced model.
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Fig. 5: Crash scenario, with the blue vehicle overtaking
the VUT (orange). The vehicle poses are plotted with a
temporal spacing of 1s, where some discrete time steps
within this 1s display are indicated by tbi and t
o
i .
trajectory rated as safe must be executed until a new
trajectory that re-satisfies all constraints is generated.
C. Integration and Test
Our illustrative system was integrated into the race
vehicle SW. Within the scope of this paper, we focused
on fault injection and requirement-based tests. Detailed
steps should be taken according to ISO 26262-4:2018,7.
D. Validation
A validation of the overall system is carried out in
order to expel possible weak spots and approve the
function in favor of the safety goal. We generated a
set of simulated scenarios and an interface feeding data
to the Supervisor as running on the real vehicle. We
generated 32 artificial critical scenarios including one or
multiple vehicles [25]. Future research will investigate an
extension of the scenario selection and generation process
based on structured methods [26], [27]. One exemplary
scenario, where another vehicle cuts off the VUT (friction
and dynamics respected throughout), is envisioned in
Fig. 5. When replaying the scenario, at each time step, the
Supervisor is facing the blue vehicle’s pose and a snippet
of the ego-trajectory starting at the corresponding pose
of the VUT.
As there is no unique correct system behavior for
dynamic collision detection, safety envelopes in which a
test passes (required latest and allowed earliest detection
time) have to be defined [8]. Within our evaluation
we set the safety envelopes as follows. The Supervisor
must fire (rate “unsafe”) no later then when a collision
results while applying maximum deceleration for the VUT
and assuming constant velocity for the other vehicle.
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Fig. 6: Safety score stot and corresponding require-
ment scores (combined acceleration acomb, RSS distances
r{lat/lon}, static collision detection sstat) for the presented
scenario. Ground truth and bounds in dotted lines.
Furthermore, the earliest point allowed to fire is when
another vehicle enters the braking distance upfront the
VUT (i.e., assuming abrupt standstill). Within this
interval, any rating is permitted. The preceding period
must be rated as “safe” and the subsequent period as
“unsafe”.
The evaluation of the scenario presented here is de-
picted in Fig. 6. The safety score stot (solid line) fits
well with the defined ground truth intervals (dotted line).
The scores for the static collision detection sstat and the
combined acceleration acomb stayed within safe bounds
the entire time. However, the RSS metrics rlat and rlon
both went below the minimum required safety distance
(dotted lines) at two time instances. In the first instance
(t ∈ [0.5s, 1.6s]), the VUT is slightly in front of the other
vehicle which is rated safe, since the race regulations state
that the rear vehicle is responsible for any crash occurring.
In the second instance (t ∈ [12.4s, 15.0s]), the crash risk is
predicted as intended. All other evaluated scenarios (with
different fault injections, e.g., exceeding friction limit or
bound collision) were correctly classified according to the
ground truth intervals.
Besides the scenario-based tests, we used logged field
data of the trajectory planner [28] executed on a full-
scale race vehicle provided by Roborace6. The vehicle was
stable throughout the runs and safety margins to other
vehicles stayed on the conservative side. The Supervisor
did not fire during these runs. This observation fits well
with our expectation. In conclusion, the Supervisor passed
our illustrative, albeit abridged, validation procedure.
VI. Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we motivated, why online verification
is an appropriate method to enable safety approval
for complex or non-traceable (e.g., AI-based) systems.
Furthermore, we proposed a framework that guides the
6For this illustration we use logged data. However, a detailed
validation should rely on no-fire tests directly on the vehicle.
development process of such a holistic online verification
method – the Supervisor – for an autonomous driving
SW stack. The Supervisor allows approval for methods
based on AI or components subjected to frequent SW
updates. The concept was illustrated using the example of
a trajectory OV module for an autonomous race vehicle.
All steps of the development were tackled, including the
creation of an extensive list of safety-relevant features for
a trajectory. The scenario-based evaluation, as well as
field data, provide insights with regard to validation of
the overall framework.
The illustrative implementation, detailed in this paper,
has limitations, especially when facing dynamic scenarios
(in this example, the safety interval for the ground truth
was chosen in a liberate fashion, leaving larger intervals
allowing any safety rating). Ongoing research is investi-
gating more elaborated methods for the safety assessment
of collisions in a dynamic environment. Furthermore, the
final version of the Supervisor module will include an
extensive validation step.
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